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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHAR'S CARS, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, and JEFFREY D. BIRSCHBACH, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
DELOY ELDER and BRUCE RUTHERFORD, 
Appellee and Defendant. 
CaseNo.20030082-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
L Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Elder, as a partner in the 
Elder/Rutherford Partnership, is liable for only one-half of the Partnership's obligations 
to Shar's Cars. 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. 
Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177, 180 (Utah 1997). 
II. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Shar's Cars agreed to 
release Elder from one-half of the debts owed to it by the Elder/Rutherford Partnership. 
Standard of Review: Issues of fact are reviewed based upon a clearly 
erroneous standard. Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989). However, no deference is given to the trial court's determination of the 
"legal effect" of facts. MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah 1998). Even if all 
facts relevant to this issue are viewed in the light most favorable to Elder, the court erred 
in determining that the legal effect of the facts was to release Elder from one-half of his 
responsibility. 
III. Whether the trial court erred in awarding damages to Shar's Cars based 
upon the net loss of the dealership as of August 31, 1998, rather than the unpaid expenses 
of the dealership as of August 31, 1998. 
Standard of Review: The core facts related to this issue are undisputed, and no 
deference is given to the trial court's determination of the "legal effect" of facts. MacKay 
v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah 1998). Moreover, the proper theory for recovery of 
damages is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 
876 P.2d 421,424 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Preservation of Issues for Review. The issues asserted by Appellants relate to 
release and the extent of damages. These issues were raised and contested by the parties 
in the trial court. (Tr. at v. 1359 pp. 325-361.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for the recovery of damages. Plaintiffs brought this action 
against Deloy Elder and Bruce Rutherford. Plaintiffs obtained default judgment in the 
amount of $400,000 against Rutherford. (ROA at 468.) Plaintiffs appeal a judgment 
entered in their favor against Elder in the amount of $22,500. Trial in this mattei was 
held on December 4 and 5, 2002, and the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and judgment on December 31, 2002. Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on 
January 21, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Operation of Dealership 
1. In approximately January 1998, Plaintiffs/Appellants Jeffrey Birschbach 
("Birschbach") and Shar's Cars, L.L.C. obtained an automobile dealer's license. (Tr. at 
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v. 1358 p. 30.) When they obtained the license, Appellants had no prior experience in the 
automobile industry. Appellants' intent was to purchase one car at a time, and 
Birschbach's wife, Sharla, would drive the car while they offered it for sale. (Id. at 56-
57.) 
2. In February 1998, Birschbach attended his first auto auction. There he met 
Defendant Deloy Elder ("Elder"). (Id. at 13, 30.) Birschbach and Elder had lived in the 
same neighborhood while attending elementary school and high school. They had played 
on the same baseball team and participated in the same scout troop. Birschbach and 
Elder had not seen each other since high school. (Id. at 29.) 
3. Shortly after the auction, Elder telephoned Birschbach and requested that he 
meet with him and a friend to discuss a business proposition. (Id. at 30.) Birschbach met 
with Elder and his friend, Bruce Rutherford ("Rutherford"), and they proposed a business 
arrangement. Elder and Rutherford explained that they had many years' experience in 
the used car business. Rutherford said he had 20 years experience, and Elder said he had 
12 years experience. Elder and Rutherford proposed that Birschbach allow them to use 
his dealer's license. In return, Elder and Rutherford would (1) pay Shar's Cars $100 per 
car sold retail; (2) pay all expenses incurred through operating the dealership; and (3) 
teach Birschbach the used car business. (Id. at 25, 31-32, 64, 67-68.) 
4. Shar's Cars began operating under the arrangement proposed by Elder and 
Rutherford in February 1998. Elder and Rutherford acted as partners in operating the 
dealership (hereinafter the "Elder/Rutherford Partnership"). (Id. at 64, 67, 70; Trial 
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment ("Findings") 
fflf 2-3, Addendum 1.) Birschbach had no involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the 
business. (Tr. at v. 1358 pp. 22, 83-84.) 
5. Elder managed the dealership and maintained the financial records for the 
dealership. He and his wife were the only signatories on the bank accounts. (Id. at 12, 
14-16; Tr. at v. 1359 p. 262.) 
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6. In late August 1998, Rutherford informed Birschbach that Elder had 
determined to discontinue his involvement in the business. He also requested that 
Birschbach and Shar's Cars continue in the business without Elder. Birschbach asked 
Rutherford how the business was doing and was told that it was down about $55000 to 
$10,000. Birschbach agreed to continue the business. Elder never contacted Birschbach 
about his withdrawal from the business. (Tr. at v. 1358 pp. 41, 45-46. 92-99; Tr. at v. 
1359 pp. 259, 263.) 
7. In the third week of October, approximately 45 days after Elder withdrew 
from the business, Birschbach was contacted by an investigator with the State of Utah. 
The investigator informed Birschbach that many cars had been purchased by Shar's Cars 
and not paid for. The investigator further informed Birschbach that Shar's Cars had sold 
many cars but had not delivered titles to the purchasers. Birschbach explained that he 
was not operating the business. However, the investigator informed him that he had full 
responsibility as the holder of the license. The investigator also informed him that each 
failure to deliver a title was a felony and he could go to prison. (Tr. at v. 1358 pp. 46-49, 
101-102, 106-107.) 
8. Birschbach then closed down Shar's Cars and embarked on an attempt to 
fix the numerous problems caused by Elder and Rutherford. Shar's Cars and Birschbach 
did not have the ability to pay the numerous debts created by Elder's and Rutherford's 
irresponsible operation of the business. Birschbach contemplated bankruptcy, but feared 
that would not solve the problems because he believed failure to pay the debts and deliver 
car titles could result in criminal charges and a prison sentence. Birschbach also feared 
that a bankruptcy filing would negatively impact his ability to continue in his mortgage 
business. (Tr. at v. 1359 pp. 218-223.) 
9. In order to solve the problems caused by Rutherford and Elder, Birschbach 
was forced to borrow money from family and other parties. Birschbach's parents had 
recently retired and paid off the mortgage on their home. Because of the problems 
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caused by Rutherford and Elder, Birschbach's parents took out a loan on their home to 
loan him $50,000, thereby putting at risk their retirement plans. Ultimately, Birschbach 
and Shar's Cars had to pay over $220,000 to resolve the problems created by Rutherford 
and Elder. (Id.) 
10. While in the midst of attempting to resolve the problems that Rutherford 
and Elder dumped into his lap, Birschbach telephoned Elder, in tears, pleading for his 
help. Elder responded that he would do nothing to help Birschbach. (Id. at 222.) 
B. Garff Leasing Bounced Check 
11. In July 1998, when Elder was still working with Shar's Cars, Shar's Cars 
delivered a check in the amount of $21,600 to Garff Leasing in payment for a truck. 
Elder signed the check. (A copy of the check is attached to Plaintiffs' Exhibit P-9.) The 
check bounced. (Id; Tr. at v. 1358 pp. 43-44.) 
12. Garff Leasing agreed to accept payments from Elder and Rutherford, and 
each signed a note promising to pay Garff Leasing one-half of the check. (Id. at 43-44.) 
Garff Leasing also required Birschbach to guarantee the notes. (Id.) 
13. Elder paid his note, but Rutherford did not. (Id. at 44.) 
C. Evidence of Damages 
14. Plaintiffs called Macey Buker, an accountant, as an expert witness at trial to 
testify as to the financial condition of the dealership. (Id. at 140-141.) Buker testified 
that he only had access to three of five accounts related to the operation of the Shar's 
Cars business. Mr. Buker testified that his analysis was not complete because the 
financial records available to him were not complete. (Id. at 142, 144-145, 161-162; Tr. 
at v. 1359 p. 324.) Buker prepared a balance sheet based on the records available to him, 
showing that Shar's Cars had total liabilities of $193,040.86 as of December 31, 1998, 
and assets of $36,541.77. (Buker Report, Plaintiffs' Ex. P-9.) Buker also testified that he 
was able to definitely identify expenses totaling $48,635.13 on Schedule A to his report 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit P-9) for which Elder should be responsible to Plaintiffs under the 
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terms of the agreement. According to Buker, this dollar figure represented cars that were 
purchased and sold by Shar's Cars before Elder left and Birschbach ultimately paid for 
the cars because of the failure of Elder and Rutherford to do so. (Tr. at v. 1358 pp. 146, 
150-151, 161-163.) Buker testified, however, that it was impossible to accurately and 
fully analyze the financial condition of the dealership as of the time Elder left because of 
incomplete or missing records. (Id. at 146, 161-162.) Buker also identified transactions 
totaling $91,466.80 on Schedule C to his report. He described these transactions as 
"unresolved" in that the financial records were inadequate to determine whether the 
transactions occurred before Elder left the business. (Id. at 151-153, 165; Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit P-9, Schedule C.) 
15. Elder called Jeffrey Jensen, an accountant, as an expert witness. (Tr. at v. 
1359 pp. 271-274.) Mr. Jensen attempted to prepare financial statements for Shar's Cars 
as of August 31, 1998, the approximate time that Elder withdrew from the business. (Id. 
at 286-287.) Mr. Jensen testified that as of the end of August 1998, Shar's Cars had a 
negative balance of $35,105.61 on its balance sheet. (Id. at 294; Defendant's Exhibit D-
13.) Because of the absence of adequate records, Jensen testified that there was an error 
factor in his analysis. His estimate was that the negative dollar figure could range from a 
low of $25,000 to $30,000 to a high of $50,000. (Tr. at v. 1359 pp. 297-299.) 
Mr. Jensen's balance sheet describes total liabilities of $130,328.60 as of the time that 
Elder left, which included $95,905 for vehicles purchased by the dealership but not paid 
for. (Id at 295; Defendants' Exhibit D-13.) 
D. Trial Court's Findings 
16. The trial court found that Birschbach and Shar's Cars entered into an 
agreement with Rutherford and Elder whereby Birschbach would allow them to use his 
dealership license for the purpose of conducting a used car business. The trial court 
further concluded that the agreement included the provision that Rutherford and Elder 
would pay all the expenses for operating the business. The court found that there was a 
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breach of contract in that all of the expenses were not paid. The court found that there 
was no novation, accord and satisfaction, waiver, or release that would relieve Elder from 
responsibility for expenses incurred prior to August 31, 1998, but that Elder was not 
responsible for anything that occurred after August 31, 1998, when he left the business. 
The court further found, however, that there was a "partial release" as to expenses 
incurred prior to August 31, 1998, and that Elder should be responsible for only one-half 
of those expenses. (Findings, Addendum 1; Trial Court's Oral Findings ("Oral 
Findings"), Addendum 2 (Tr. at v. 1359 pp. 354-361).) 
17. With respect to the damages, the court relied upon the testimony of Elder's 
expert, Jeffrey Jensen, who testified that Shar's Cars had a negative balance on its 
balance sheet of approximately $35,000 as of August 31, 1998. Recognizing Mr. 
Jensen's margin of error, the court concluded that the real net loss was $45,000. The 
court concluded that due to the partial release, Elder would be responsible for one-half of 
the $45,000 figure. (Id.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court erred in concluding that Elder, as a partner in the 
Elder/Rutherford Partnership, was liable for only one-half of the Partnership's 
obligations to Birschbach and Shar's Cars for the time period prior to August 
31,1998. 
Under Utah law, a partner is jointly and severally liable for tort obligations of the 
partnership, and jointly liable for contractual obligations of the partnership. The only 
difference between a partner's liability for torts and contracts is that in the case of 
contractual liability plaintiff must first exhaust partnership assets before attempting to 
recover from individual partners. A partner's joint liability for the partnership's 
contractual debts means that the partner will be liable for the full amount of the debt. 
In the present case, the Elder/Rutherford Partnership was obligated to pay all 
expenses from operating the dealership. The dealership stopped operating, and 
-7-
Birschbach and Shar's Cars were forced to pay total debt of $220,000 which the 
Partnership had failed to pay. It is clear that Plaintiffs cannot recover from assets of the 
Partnership, and Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from Elder the full amount of the debt 
existing at the time Elder left the business. 
B. The trial court erred in finding that Shar's Cars agreed to waive or release Elder 
from one-half of the debts owed to it by the Elder/Rutherford Partnership for the 
time period prior to August 31,1998. 
The trial court expressly found that there was no release or waiver of Elder's 
obligations to Plaintiffs for the time period prior to August 31, 1998. However, the trial 
court held that there was a partial release of Elder for obligations prior to this date to the 
extent of one-half of the obligations. Elder did not argue for such a partial release at trial, 
and there is no evidence to support this position. 
It appears that the trial court relied upon circumstances related to the Garff 
Leasing bounced check to conclude that there was a partial release of Elder. Elder and 
Rutherford each agreed with Garff that they would sign a note for one-half of the amount 
of the bounced check. Elder paid his one-half and Rutherford did not. However, there is 
no evidence whatsoever with respect to any discussion or understanding among the 
parties about Plaintiffs' claims against Elder and Rutherford in the event either failed to 
pay his note. The only evidence relates to attempts to resolve Garff Leasing's claim for 
the bounced check. There is no evidence whatsoever with respect to any attempt to 
adjust or resolve claims by Birschbach or Shar's Cars against Elder or Rutherford in the 
event they failed to pay for the bounced check. In addition, the facts related to the Garff 
Leasing bounced check could hardly be a basis to find a waiver by Birschbach and Shar's 
Cars with respect to other debts owed by the Elder/Rutherford Partnership. 
Utah law applies a strict standard when determining whether a waiver or release 
has occurred. The intent to waive or release claims must be distinct and unequivocal. In 
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the present case, there is no evidence of such intent to waive or release Elder for one-half 
of the obligations for the time period prior to August 31,1998. 
C. The trial court erred in awarding damages to Shar's Cars and Birschbach based 
upon the dealership's net loss as of August 31, 1998 rather than based upon its 
outstanding expenses as of that date. 
This Court is not required to give any deference to the trial court's determination 
as to the appropriate theory for recovery of damages. In the present case, the trial court 
found that the Elder/Rutherford Partnership agreed to pay all expenses incurred by the 
dealership. However, the trial court determined damages based upon the net balance 
sheet loss of the dealership as of August 31, 1998 rather than based upon the outstanding 
expenses as of that date. The theory for recovery adopted by the trial court is not 
consistent with the parties' agreement. 
The trial court should have entered judgment for at least $130,000. This is the 
amount estimated by Defendants' own expert as the outstanding liabilities of the 
dealership as of August 31, 1998. In order for Elder to escape responsibility for these 
liabilities, he has the obligation to show that those liabilities were paid by himself or the 
business because payment is an affirmative defense under Utah law. A party who asserts 
an affirmative defense bears the burden to establish the defense. 
The experts retained by both Elder and Plaintiffs admitted that the financial 
records of the dealership were incomplete, making a definitive analysis of the dealership 
impossible. The trial court adopted a theory of recovery and calculated damages in the 
most conservative fashion possible. In so doing, the trial court allowed Elder to benefit 
from his own failure to maintain adequate financial records for the business. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court erred in concluding that Elder, as a partner in the 
Elder/Rutherford Partnership, was liable for only one-half of the Partnership's 
obligations to Birschbach and Shar's Cars for the time period prior to 
August 31,1998. 
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The trial court found that there was a contract between the Elder/Rutherford 
Partnership and Birschbach and Shar s Cars with respect to the Partnership's operation of 
the Shar's Cars dealership. The court further found that the contract required the 
Partnership to pay all the expenses arising from the operation of the dealership, and the 
court also found that there was a breach of the contract in that the Partnership failed to 
pay all of those expenses. The court also concluded that Elder was responsible for the 
breach only until the time he left the business in August 1998. (Findings, fflf 2 and 8, 
attached as Addendum 1; Tr. at 357-360; see Oral Findings, Addendum 2.) The court 
found that the total damage from the breach of contract was $45,000, but, for reasons that 
are not entirely clear, concluded that Elder should be responsible for only one-half of the 
Partnership's obligation to Birschbach. 
The trial court's determination that Eider should be responsible for only one-half 
of the Partnership's debt to Birschbach is contrary to well-settled law. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§48-1-12 states: 
1. Except as provided in Subsection (2), all partners are liable: 
(a) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the 
partnership under sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11. 
(b) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership, 
except a partner may enter into a separate obligation to 
perform a partnership contract. 
Subsection (l)(a) applies to certain kinds of torts and is inapplicable. Subsection (l)(b) 
applies to contractual obligations and governs the liability of Elder as a partner in the 
Elder/Rutherford Partnership.1 
As set forth in § 48-1-12, partners in a partnership are jointly and severally liable 
for tort obligations but only jointly liable for contractual obligations. The distinction 
1
 The full text of §§ 48-1-10, 48-1-11, and 48-1-12 is set out in Addendum 3 attached 
hereto. 
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between joint and several liability and joint liability does not alter Elder's liability for all 
of the Partnership's debt in the present case. In Ryan v. Brophy, 755 F. Supp. 595 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), the court discussed the distinction between a partner's joint and several 
liability for torts and joint liability for contractual claims under similar statutory 
provisions in New York. The court concluded as follows: 
Under New York law, partners in a partnership are jointly and severally 
liable for tort claims against the partnership, but only jointly liable for 
contract claims against the partnership. The result of this distinction is that 
while tort claims may be asserted against the individual partners in the first 
instance, contract claims must be asserted first against the partnership itself, 
and not the individual partners, unless the partnership is insolvent or 
otherwise unable to pay its debts. The policy underlying this distinction 
seems to be that in ordinary contract disputes, partners should be protected 
from individual liability and the resultant need to seek contribution from 
each other if the partnership has sufficient assets to satisfy the judgment. 
Id. at 597-598 (citations omitted).2 
In McCune & McCune v. Mountain Bell Telephone, 758 P.2d 914 (Utah 1988), 
Mountain Bell attempted to recover a partnership's debt from one of its partners. As in 
the Ryan case, the court concluded that under the Utah Uniform Partnership Act, partners 
are jointly liable for partnership contractual obligations and jointly and severally liable 
for torts. The court concluded that Mountain Bell must first exhaust partnership assets 
before attempting to recover the partnership contractual debt from one of the partners. Id. 
at 918; see also Palle v. Industrial Commission, 7 P.2d 284, 288 (Utah 1932) (Partner 
may not be sued without naming the partnership or all partners as parties.) 
2
 The relevant section of New York's partnership statute provides as follows: 
§ 26. Nature of Partner's Liability, (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) of 
this section, all partners are liable: 
(1) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under 
sections twenty-four and twenty-five. 
(2) Jointly for all other obligations of the partnership; but any partner may enter 
into a separate obligation to perform a partnership contract. 
Relevant provisions from the New York Partnership Act are included in Addendum 4. 
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It is well settled law that a partner is jointly liable for all of the debts of the 
partnership. This means that each partner is liable for the whole amount of the 
partnership's debt. Commercial Asphalt, Inc. v. Smith. 436 P.2d 849, 854 (Kan. 1968). 
The only limitation is that the creditor must first exhaust partnership assets before 
recovering from individual partners. 
In the present case, it is clear that no recovery can be had from the 
Elder/Rutherford Partnership. The Partnership ceased its operation of the Shar's Cars 
dealership, and Birschbach, the owner of the dealership license, was required to pay 
expenses of $220,000 which the Partnership was obligated to cover. Plaintiffs also 
obtained a $400,000 uncollectible default judgment against Rutherford. There is no basis 
whatsoever in partnership law for the trial court's conclusion that Elder should be 
responsible for only one-half of the Partnership's debt. 
B. The trial court erred in finding that Skar's Cars agreed to waive or release Elder 
from one-half of the debts owed to it by the Elder/Rutherford Partnership for the 
period prior to August 31,1998. 
The trial court concluded that the Elder/Rutherford Partnership breached its 
contract to pay expenses to Birschbach. At trial, Elder argued that he had been 
completely released from any liability for Partnership obligations based on the 
circumstances of his withdrawal from the business. The trial court expressly rejected 
Elder's argument that there was a novation, release, or waiver in favor of Elder, 
concluding that: 
9. The court finds that there was no novation, accord and satisfaction, or 
waiver ba^ed upon the contractual terms of the agreement and the 
meeting of the minds. 
11. The court also finds that Mr. Elder was not released of any 
responsibility prior to August 31, 1998. 
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(Findings fflf 9 and 11, attached as Addendum 1; see also Oral Findings, Tr. at 357-358, 
attached as Addendum 2.) 
The court, however, appears to have found that there was a partial release of Elder 
by Birschbach with respect to one-half of the debt owed by the Elder/Rutherford 
Partnership prior to August 31, 1998. A party that challenges a finding of fact is required 
to marshal the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence 
is insufficient to support the finding. Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, 
782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). Elder does not appear to have ever made an argument 
for such a partial release at trial. Even if a deferential standard of review is applied to the 
trial court's determination of a partial release, this determination does not withstand 
careful scrutiny. 
It appears that the trial court relied on evidence related to the Garff Leasing 
bounced check to conclude that there was a partial release. (Tr. at 359-360, attached as 
Addendum 2.) Prior to the time Elder left the business, the dealership purchased a 
vehicle from Garff Leasing. Elder signed a check in the amount of $21,600 to pay for the 
car, and the check bounced. As the holders of the dealership license, Shar's Cars and 
Birschbach were ultimately obligated to Garff Leasing. Inasmuch as this was an expense 
incurred by the Elder/Rutherford Partnership in running the business, it was an expense 
that the Partnership was required to pay on behalf of Birschbach and Shar's Cars. As a 
member of the Partnership, Elder was jointly liable, and can be held responsible for the 
full amount of the debt. When all of the evidence on the record is reviewed with respect 
to this transaction, it falls far short of establishing any intention by Birschbach or Shar's 
Cars of releasing Elder from anything. 
Birschbach testified that Garff Leasing was willing to accept payments for the 
bounced check as long as Rutherford and Elder each signed a note for one-half of the 
total amount of the check. Garff Leasing also required that Birschbach guarantee the 
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notes. Elder paid his half of the note, and Rutherford did not, and Birschbach had no 
alternative but to pay the balance of the bounced check. (Tr. at 43-44, 103-106.) 
With respect to the bounced check, Elder testified as follows: 
Q: And how come you only paid one half? 
A: Well, I didn't feel like I was responsible for 100 percent of it. I felt 
like I was responsible for some of it, at least half because it was when 
I was there. 
Q: And you paid that half? 
A: I did. 
Q: And Mr. Birschbach knew you paid that half? 
A: He did. 
Q: And he was in agreement with the arrangement that you pay half and 
Mr. Rutherford pay half? 
A: Yes, he was very acceptive of it. 
(Tr. at 258-259.) Elder also testified as follows: 
Q: You stated that on this check with Garff that when you arranged for 
payment of half of that, that it was your impression that Mr. 
Birschbach was accepting of that; is that true? 
A: Correct. 
Q: What way was he accepting of that? 
A: He was accepting as to he was happy that we were going to take care 
of the loan, not a loan, the bounced check which was made to Garff 
Leasing which was his relative so he could stay in good standing. 
(Id. at 265.) Elder further testified as follows: 
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Q: One last question on Mr. Birschbach saying that he was accepting of 
your resolution of this check, do you recall if or what specifically he 
said that gave you that impression? 
A: I cannot recall specifically, no. 
(Mat p. 269.) 
Utah law defines waiver as "an intentional relinquishment of a known right." 
Paster, Gould, Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1994). The 
elements of waiver include: 
(1) an existing right, benefit or advantage; (2) knowledge of the existence 
of that right, benefit or advantage; and (3) an intention to relinquish that 
right, benefit or advantage. 
Id. Utah law requires that "the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct." Soter }s, Inc. 
v. Federal Savings and Loan Association, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). 
Although waiver may be implied, the doctrine of waiver is strictly applied and the 
party asserting waiver bears a heavy burden. In Soter1 s, the court discussed the 
intentional relinquishment requirement and stated that "any waiver must be distinctly 
made, although it may be express or implied." Id. (quoting Phoenix, Inc. v. Heath, 61 
P.2d 308, 311 (Utah 1936)). The court went on to note as follows: 
[Although the necessary intent may be clear or distinct when there is an 
express waiver, such intent may be more difficult to prove when waiver is 
to be implied from conduct or silence. Consistent with this point is the 
general principle in our case law that "[m]ere silence is not a waiver unless 
there is some duty or obligation to speak." 
Id. (quoting Plateau Mining Co. v. Division of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 730 
(Utah 1990)). 
A party seeking to show waiver bears a heavy burden to show a "distinct" intent to 
waive. The dictionary defines "distinct" as "Capable of being readily seen, felt, or heard 
through sharp, clear, unmistakable impression; not blurred, obscured, or indefinite." 
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WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, Unabridged (1976). Utah law is 
consistent with a recognized commentary, which provides: 
Waiver of rights is a serious matter; it is not generally presumed and is of 
the strictest application. Thus, a waiver is not favored, and should be found 
only in exceptional circumstances. 
31 CJS ESTOPPEL AND WAIVER, § 67(b) p. 435. 
Utah law imposes an equally heavy burden on a party who attempts to establish 
the defense of release. Utah law requires that "a release, to be enforceable, must at a 
minimum be unambiguous, explicit, and unequivocal." Simonson v. Travis, 728 P.2d 
999, 1002 (Utah 1986). 
In the present case5 the evidence before the trial court falls far short of establishing 
an intent on the part of Birschbach and Shar's Cars to waive or release any claims against 
Elder for at least two reasons. First, the evidence before the trial court related only to the 
attempts by the parties to satisfy the claims made by Garff Leasing. Garff Leasing was 
willing to accept payments through two notes, one signed by Elder and one signed by 
Rutherford, as long as the notes were guaranteed by Birschbach. Thus, the evidence only 
relates to resolving the claims of Garff Leasing, and has no bearing on resolving claims 
by Shar's Cars or Birschbach against Elder and Rutherford. Shar's Cars and Birschbach 
did not sign any document waiving or releasing any claim against Elder or Rutherford. 
Indeed, there is no evidence whatsoever concerning whether the parties even addressed 
the issue of claims against Elder and Rutherford by Birschbach and Shar's Cars in the 
event Elder or Rutherford failed to make payments to Garff Leasing. 
When questioned at trial, Elder could not recall any conversation with Birschbach 
that could be the basis for any argument that Birschbach was releasing Elder for one-half 
of the bounced check obligation. At best, the only evidence is that Elder thought he 
should only be responsible for one-half of the bounced check apparently because he was 
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a fifty-fifty partner with Rutherford. However, Utah law makes partners liable for the 
entire partnership debt, not just one-half of the debt. 
Second, even if the evidence did show an intent on the part of Shar's Cars and 
Birschbach to release Elder for one-half of the Garff Leasing bounced check, that is 
hardly a basis for releasing Elder from one-half of all of the obligations of the 
Elder/Rutherford Partnership to Shar's Cars and Birschbach. 
C. The trial court erred in awarding damages to Shar's Cars and Birschbach 
based upon the dealership's net loss as of August 31, 1998 rather than based 
upon its outstanding expenses as of that date. 
In the present case, both parties retained experts to examine the financial condition 
of the dealership and to address the issue of damages. Jeffrey Jensen, the expert for 
Elder, testified that the net loss for the dealership as of August 31, 1998 was $35,000. 
Jensen admitted, however, that there was a substantial error factor in his analysis, and the 
net loss could range from $25,000 to $50,000. He also testified that the dealership's 
outstanding debts as of that date were approximately $130,000. 
Plaintiffs expert, Macey Buker, testified that Elder should be responsible for at 
least $48,635.13 in damages pursuant to the terms of the parties' agreement. He also 
testified that there were transactions totaling $91,466.86 that he could not resolve due to 
incomplete financial information. He also testified that as of the end of 1998, the 
dealership had debts of $193,040.86. 
An undisputed fact at trial was also that Birschbach ultimately paid $220,000 to 
satisfy all of the debts left unpaid due to Elder's and Rutherford's irresponsible operation 
of the business. 
Both experts noted that the records for the dealership were incomplete, making a 
definitive analysis impossible. The trial court noted this, finding and reasoning as 
follows: 
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Now the question is, what's the amount of damages. I've got an 
approximation from Buker and candidly so. I've got an approximation 
from Jensen, candidly so. Neither one of them has had the opportunity to 
look at everything and if they did Fm not sure they could come up with any 
definitive answers anyway. I've got a range of damages of $220,000 from 
Mr. Buker, but that goes all the way to the end of 1998 where the Court 
finds that the only relevant time is February of 1998 to the end of August of 
1998. 
(Tr. at 360, attached as Addendum 2.) The trial court went on to rely on Jeffrey Jensen's 
evidence of the net loss or negative balance of between $25,000 and $50,000 as of 
August 31, 1998. The court fixed the net loss at $45,000 and calculated the damages 
based upon that amount. {Id. at 36.) The trial court erred in fixing damages in this 
manner for at least two reasons. 
First, the trial court used the wrong theory for recovery when it calculated 
damages based upon the net balance sheet loss as of August 31, 1998 rather than upon the 
outstanding expenses as of that date. This court is not required to give any deference to 
the trial court's determination concerning the theory for recovery of damages. Bailey-
Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The theory for 
recovery adopted by the trial coun is not based upon the parties' agreement. The trial 
court found that the parties agreed that the Elder/Rutherford Partnership would pay 
Birschbach and Shar's Cars for all expenses incurred in the operation of the business. 
The agreement was not that the Partnership would pay the net loss of the dealership at 
any given point in time. 
Assuming the trial court correctly ruled that Elder should only be liable for any 
breach of contract preceding August 31, 1998, the damages should be based upon the 
outstanding expenses of the business at that time, not on the net loss of the business as 
shown on its balance sheet. At a minimum, the trial court should have entered judgment 
against Elder for $130,000. 
The only way for Elder to escape responsibility for the debts existing when he left 
the business would be to show that those debts were paid by himself or the business. 
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Payment is an affirmative defense. UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(c). A party asserting an 
affirmative defense has the burden to prove it. Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 
615 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1980). 
The record is void of evidence that the debts outstanding when Elder left the 
business were paid. Indeed, the only evidence is to the contrary. Elder left the business 
on approximately August 31, 1998. Only a month and a half later, about the third week 
of October, Birschbach shut the dealership down after he was contacted by state 
investigators and he learned of its desperate financial condition. He ultimately had to pay 
$220,000 to resolve all the debts that he was left with. Clearly, after Elder left the 
business, its debts only grew. The debts did not decrease. 
In addition, the trial court erred in selecting the most conservative possible method 
for calculating damages. The trial court's approach allows Elder, a wrongdoer, the 
benefit of all doubt with respect to what the damages should be. The trial court's 
approach to damages is contrary to Utah law: 
The level of persuasiveness required to establish the fact of loss is generally 
higher than that required to establish the amount of a loss. It is, after all, 
the wrongdoer, rather than the injured party, who should bear the burden of 
some uncertainty in the amount of damages. While the standard for 
determining the amount of damages is not so exacting as the standard for 
proving the fact of damages, there still must be evidence that rises above 
speculation and provides a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, 
estimate of damages. . . . The amount of damages may be based upon 
approximations, if the fact of damage is established, and the 
approximations are based upon reasonable assumptions or projections. 
Atkin Wright & Miles v. The Mountain State Telephone and Telegraph Co., 709 P.2d 330, 
336 (Utah 1985) (emphasis in original; citations omitted); see also Cook Associates, Inc. 
v. Warnick Sales and Service, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1983); Promax Development 
Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied 953 P.2d 489 
(Utah 1997). 
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In the present case, Elder was entrusted with operating the business, and 
Birschbach had no involvement with its day-to-day affairs. Until he left on August 31, 
1998, Elder was responsible for the dealership's financial records, yet those records were 
in such disarray that it was impossible for the accountants retained by the parties to 
accurately analyze the financial condition of the business. In those circumstances, it was 
error for the trial court to fix the damages so low. The trial court allowed Elder, a 
wrongdoer, to benefit from his own failure to maintain adequate financial records. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court with respect to its determination that 
Elder is liable only for one-half of the Elder/Rutherford Partnership's obligations to 
Plaintiffs. 
This Court should also reverse the trial court's determination to calculate damages 
based upon the dealership's net loss as of August 31, 1998. The Court should reverse and 
remand to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs for 
$130,000. This figure represents the outstanding debt of the dealership as of August 31, 
1998 as determined by Elder's own expert. 
DATED this IXr1 day of June, 2003. 
KRUSE LAND A MAYCOCK & PJCKS 
/J 
STEVEN G. LOOSL 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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 mrMCi stOIT 
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Attorneys for Plaintoffs ' "M C^/ / / DATE 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHAR' S CARS, a Limited Liability I FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
Company and JEFFREY D. B I R S C H B A C H J CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DELOY ELDER and 
BRUCE RUTHERFORD, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990906886 
Judge Iwasaki 
This matter came for trial before die Honorable Judge Iwasaki on December 4, 2002 and 
December 5, 2002. Plaintiff was present and represented by Victoria Cramer and Aric Cramer. 
Defendant, Deloy Elder, was present and represented by John Rice. After hearing the evidence 
presented by the parties the Court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. The Court finds that there was a contract; 
2. That the terms of the contract were as follows: That Mr. Birschbach would allow 
Mr. Rutherford and Mr. Elder to use Mr. Birschbach's dealer's license for the purpose of conducting 
business under Shar' s Cars. Mr. Rutherford and Mr. Elder would teach Mr. Birschbach how to work 
with car auction and the ins and outs of the used car business. That 5100 per retail car and expenses 
was to be paid. That the parties agreed to continue together in future dealings with other lots. 
3. The Court also finds that there was no agreement that anything with Shar's Cars, 
LLC. was to be assumed by Mr. Rutherford and Mr Elder, rather that Shar's Cars, LL.C. was a 
separate entity apart from the Rutherford-Elder partnership. Therefore, the Court finds no causes 
of action in corporate conversion or corporate mismanagement 
4. The Court finds that Mr. Elder owed no fiduciary duty. Therefore, the Court finds 
no causes of action in breach of fiduciary duty. 
5. The Court also finds that if the Court was to assume that there was negligent 
misrepresentation it would also find that Mr. Birschbach unreasonably relied upon the statements 
and the relationship with Mr. Elder. Therefore, the Court finds no causes of action in negligent 
misrepresentation. 
6. The Court finds that there was no promise that was relied upon and if a promise was 
found it would be unreasonable to rely on such a promise. Therefore, the Court finds no causes of 
action in promissory estoppel. 
7. That if the Court found that there was negligence in running the business to the 
detriment of Mr. Birschbach that the claim would be defeated by a comparable negligence analysis. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the causes of action in negligence is defeated by at least 50% 
negligence on the part of Mr. Birschbach. 
8. The Court finds that there has been a breach of contract as expenses have not been 
paid. 
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9. The Court finds that there was no novation, accord and satisfaction, or waiver 
based upon the contractual terms of the agreement and the meeting of the minds. 
10. The Court finds that there was a new agreement based upon a discussion between 
Mr. Birschbach and Mr. Rutherford whereby Mr. Rutherford told Mr. Birschbach that Mr. Elder 
was no longer involved. The new agreement stated that Mr. Birschbach and Mr. Rutherford would 
continue together, without Mr. Elder, on the same tenns as the previous agreement; that there was 
a new term to the agreement as to the opening of subsequent lots; that Mr. Birschbach accepted Mr. 
Rudierford's position and did not attempt to contact Mr. Elder after Mr. Elder left, which added to 
the Court's finding of comparative negligence. 
1 ]. The Court also finds that Mr. Elder was not released of any responsibility prior to 
August 31, 1998 and would be responsible for damages from February 1998 to August 1998, that 
Mr. Elder signed a note for one-half of the S21,600.00 owed to Ken Garff Leasing, which shows 
his good faith in trying to resolve his debts. 
12. The Court also finds that Mr. Elder was responsible for one-half of the damages for 
the period of February 1998 to August 1998. The Court has been presented with the option between 
S220,000 in damages and $35,000.00 in damages. 
13. The Court finds that Mr. Elder is responsible for one-half of the $45,000,000 in 
damages which constitutes 522,500.00. 
ORDER and JUDGMENT 
WHEREFORE, the Court Adjudges, Decrees 3nd Orders that Defendant Elder is to pay 
Jeff Birschbach an amount of $22,500.00 which constitutes Plaintiffs' damages in the above-
referenced case. 
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DATED this JOtos of fjwr.. . 200 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Dated this day of December 2002. 
B^.'iDisthct'Gouit Judge 
ve.. ^->, >•-•, 
John E. Rice 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANT 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that in accordance with Rule 4-504(2), Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, the undersigned shall submit the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the Court for signature and entry upon die expiration of five (5) days 
from the date hereof, unless written notice of your objection thereto is submitted to the Court and 
the undersigned prior to that time. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this \Q day of December. 2002,1 served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law upon the following parries: 
Mr. John Rice 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 396 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
JeffBirschbach 
9176 South 300 West, #22 
Sandy, Utah 34070 
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Tab 2 
1 combined momentum of all of these things then came up at that 
2 point. 
3 Now Mr. Birschbach, I believe, did mitigate his 
4 damages. As soon as he found out that there was a problem, he 
5 testified that he spent the majority of his time cleaning it 
6 up. He went around, he borrowed money, he paid off the debts, 
7 he sub-let the Shar's Cars lots, immediately extricated himself 
8 and borrowed money from friends and family to pay all of the 
9 debts off and paid them all of. He did vindicate (inaudible). 
10 It's not like he just blew it off and then it all, you know, 
11 something else came to it. In fact, this lawsuit came because 
12 Brasher's Auto Auction sued him on his bond for vehicles that 
13 were sold and hadn't been paid and he had to come in and pay 
14 that off and that's part of this record, satisfaction that he 
15 paid them off. So, I don't think that the defendant has proved 
16 the comparative negligence claim and that's his burden of proof 
17 to show that his duty was to get into their business and find 
18 out exactly where they were at every day. That's not how it 
19 was run. It wasn't their course of dealings. But as soon as 
20 there were red flags that came up, Mr. Birschbach addressed 
21 those and took care of them. I believe that addresses any new 
22 issue that has been brought up on his closing unless the Court 
23 has any questions. 
24 THE COURT: I don't. Thank you, Mr. Cramer, 
25 appreciate it. Court finds that there was a contract. The 
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1 terms of the contract was as follows: Number one, that the 
2 plaintiff Mr. Eirschbach will allow Rutherford and Elder to use 
3 his dealer's license for the purpose of conducting business 
4 under Shar's Cars along with teaching plaintiff the ropes, if 
5 you will, as to the auction business and used car business; 
6 $100 per retail car paid; expenses to be paid and then there 
7 was another provision that they all agreed upon in future 
8 dealings, that they would also continue in the future on this 
9 matter with other lots. 
10 There is no agreement that anything regarding the LLC 
11 was to be assumed by Elder and Rutherford. There is nothing 
12 even implicit in the agreement that they were to be responsible 
13 for anything dealing with the LLC. It's just the opposite, tne 
14 LLC was to be separate, apart from Elder and Rutherford and I 
15 think it was exhibited and I think in Mr. Cramer's, one of the 
16 last statements he made about the division of the books. The 
17 books are separate, the business is separate and so any causes 
18 of actions having to deal with corporate conversion, corporate 
19 mismanagement, based upon that, there will be no cause on these 
20 causes of actions. 
21 As to breach of fiduciary duty, the Court finds that 
22 there was no duty and so if there's no duty, there would be no 
23 breach on the matter. 
24 As to negligent misrepresentations and promissory 
25 estoppel, even assuming that there were misrepresentations, and 
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1 the Court doesn't go that far, but even assuming there were 
2 misrepresentations, as to the negligent misrepresentations, 
3 it's clear to me that there was an unreasonable reliance upon 
4 statements. I look at the factual background of these 
5 individuals, i.e., Birschbach and Eider and true, they were 
6 acquaintances in high school but Birschbach said that we didn't 
7 hang around. We weren't friends. They were acquaintances. 
8 Then approximately two decades go by, maybe 17, 18 years go by 
9 and they have a chance meeting at an auction and renew 
10 acquaintances, conversation then and a subsequent conversation. 
11 Why would anyone have a level of trust of not seeing anybody 
12 over that amount of time to be able to rely upon what they're 
13 saying and to somehow to their detriment believe everything 
14 someone is saying that they haven't seen for 18 years? True, 
15 you had the ecclesiastical relationship. That's a product of 
16 naivety or gross unreasonable reliance upon relationships 
17 because the Court does not reach that point, so therefore, any 
18 negligent misrepresentation will be no cause. 
19 Promissory estoppel, the Court does not find any 
20 promise that was relied upon and if there was a promise, then 
21 it was unrealistic and unreasonable reliance upon any promise. 
22 That also goes to the wayside. 
23 Negligence. If there were negligence, and in the 
24 broad sense of the word, the negligence of Elder and Rutherford 
25 in running the business to the detriment of Birschbach, if 
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1 that's so and the Court is not saying that's so, but if that's 
2 so, that's defeated by a comparable negligent analysis, a 
3 comparable negligence analysis. Who had the most to lose in 
4 this matter? Not who had the most to gain, but who had the 
5 most to lose? Well, Birschbach did. The only asset in this 
6 whole thing was Birschbach's license and I guess I can be 
7 corrected, the sweat equity if you will of Elder and 
8 Rutherford. But why doesn't plaintiff, Birschbach, have the 
9 obligation to insure his own assets in this matter? And in 
10 that regard, he's a sophisticated businessman. I agree with 
11 Mr. Rice, Mr. Birschbach has shown that he's been successful in 
12 the mortgage business. He understands the importance of 
13 getting things in writing. He understands that agreements must 
14 be done. He understands responsibilities but apparently he 
15 just decided to close his eyes and rely upon whatever 
16 representations may or may not be said to him, whether 
17 reasonable or unreasonable, and then come into court and say, I 
18 was done wrong. Well, that's not how it works. If there is a 
19 negligence cause of action, that is voided at least by 50 
20 percent negligence on the part of the plaintiff, if there was 
21 and the Court does not say that there is but if there was, the 
22 Court would find there would be no cause based upon the 
23 comparative aspect of it. 
24 As to breach. As to breach of contract, there was a 
25 contract as I said, the terms I expressed and there has been a 
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1 breach. There has been a breach in that expenses have not been 
2 paid. Now, the Court does not find novation, does not find 
3 accord and satisfaction, does not find waiver, and does not 
4 find those based on the contractual terms of agreement and 
5 meeting of the minds. I agree that there was no butting heads 
6 of the minds here but there's been no agreement in the broadest 
7 sense as between and among Rutherford, Elder, and Birschbach to 
8 release Elder of all his responsibilities prior to August 31st 
9 of 1998. The Court expressly finds however, that he is not 
10 responsible for anything after August 31st of 1998, that there 
11 was in fact a new agreement and that was based upon the 
12 football field, practice football field discussion which is 
13 uncontroverted and I heard it from three different people and 
14 surprisingly it was the same thing from three different people 
15 which is surprising to this Court. Number one, that Rutherford 
16 told Birschbach, hey, Elder's not involved in this any more. 
17 Two, what are we going to do? We're going to go it alone, 
18 Rutherford and Birschbach agreed to continue alone with the 
19 same terms, i.e. Rutherford runs it, he pays $100 per car, he 
20 pays $100 per retail, he pays expenses and he continues to show 
21 the ropes to plaintiff in this matter as well as the new term 
22 which is now in effect, opening up the second lot or even a 
23 subsequent lot after that. 
24 If it weren't for that agreement, and further the 
25 fact that plaintiff did not even contact the defendant, Elder, 
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1 at the time of finding out that he was leaving, didn't bother 
2 to talk with him about the reasons why he was leaving. That's 
3 another reason for the comparative negligence aspect of it. If 
4 he would have tried to contact Elder, Elder would have said, 
5 Rutherford is not doing a good job. In fact, there was 
6 testimony, was there not, that there was something said about 
7 watch out for Rutherford and if that was said to plaintiff, 
8 which I believe it was, then plaintiff may have been on notice 
9 as to Rutherford and he assumes it from then on. But if I'm 
10 wrong in saying the plaintiff even got that message, watch out 
11 for Rutherford, still, he accepted the proposition of the 
12 football field with Rutherford that we're going to start a new 
13 arrangement and it will be from this day forward because Elder 
14 is out of it. Everyone accepted the fact that Elder was out of 
15 it. 
16 When Mr. Cramer indicated equity demands clean hands, 
17 I think one of the most instructive points of this clean hands 
18 is how Elder stepped to the plate and took care of that bourced 
19 check and he didn't pay it all, no he didn't, but he signed a 
20 note for half of it. He paid his half of it and he shouldn't 
21 be responsible for any more on that bounced check pursuant to 
22 the agreement. But to me that's indicative of his clean hands, 
23 his good faith in trying to clear up and as he said, either 
24 wind down or wrap up the partnership between Rutherford and 
25 Elder prior to the end of August of 1998. 
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1 That being that case and the Court finding there has 
2 been no novation, does find a partial release on that, and 
3 equity would assume, equity would have it that whatever damages 
4 sustained by plaintiff for the breach will be one half of 
5 Elder's responsibility. 
6 Now the question is, what's the amount of damages? 
7 I've got an approximation from Buker and candidly so. I've got 
8 an approximation from Jensen, candidly so. Neither one of them 
9 has had the opportunity to look at everything and if they did 
10 I'm not so sure that they could come up with any definitive 
11 answers anyway. I've got a range of damages of $220,000 from 
12 Mr. Buker, but that goes all the way to the end of 1998 where 
13 the Court finds that the only relevant time is February of 1998 
14 to the end of August of 1998. While Buker did not do that 
15 analysis, Mr. Cramer in his argument tells me, Well, it's 
16 $160,000 at that time. I don't know where he got that number. 
17 It could have been (inaudible), which is his argument. The 
18 Courts not accepting it as evidence. But I don't have anything 
19 from plaintiff's side as to the amount of loss or damages in 
20 that discreet time of February to the end of August of 1998. 
21 What I do have is - it's not even accounting, is a 
22 report by Jensen indicating that his focal time was during that 
23 time and that his opinion was that based upon all that he could 
24 have at the time, $35,000 or change was about the amount that 
25 we're talking about as to the negative balance in this matter, 
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1 plus or minus. Plus or minus what? He said $50,000 outside, 
2 about $25,000 IO $30,000 on the downside. It's apparent on 
3 cross examination that it should be to the higher level, higher 
4 than $35,000 based upon the rebuttal evidence as to what was in 
5 the ending inventory or not in the ending inventory at the time 
6 of August 31 of *98. There apparently was some cars in 
7 inventory that had previously been sold but anyway, this is all 
8 part of the approximation. 
9 Where the argument of Mr. Rice justifiably to argue 
10 that is speculation if I give any damages at all, the Court is 
11 satisfied that an approximation based upon reasonable basis and 
12 reliance on tne work down by the experts, I can then give a 
13 damage and the damage is as follows: I'm saying that I'm 
14 taking the higher level of $35,000 plus. So I'm going to put 
15 that at $45,000. I'm going to split that in half. $22,500 
16 would be the responsibility of Elder for the breach of the 
17 contract as I have indicated. That's going to be the award in 
18 this matter and it's based upon what I've said. 
19 Questions? 
20 MR. RICE: None here, Your Honor. 
21 MR. CRAMER: Nor I. 
22 THE COURT: I didn't rule for either one of you but 
23 who wants to prepare it? 
24 MS. CRAMER: We'll prepare it. 
25 THE COURT: Will you prepare it and give it to Mr. 
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Tab 3 
48-1-10, Partnership bound by partner's wrongful act 
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the 
business of the partnership or with the authority of his copartners loss or injury is caused to any 
person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable 
therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 13; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,69-1-10, 
© 2003 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions 
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement 
48-1-11. Partnership bound by partner's breach of trust. 
The partnership is bound to make good the loss: 
(1) where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority receives money or 
property of a third person and misapplies it; and, 
(2) where the partnership in the course of its business receives money or property of a third 
person and the money or property so received is misapplied by any partner while it is in the 
custody of the partnership. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 14 ; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 69-1-11. 
© 2003 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions 
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), all partners are liable: 
(a) jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under Sections 48-1-10 
and 48-1-11. 
(b) jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership, except a partner may enter 
into a separate obligation to perform a partnership contract. 
(2) (a) A partner in a limited liability partnership is not liable, directly or indirectly, 
including by way of indemnification, contribution or otherwise, for a debt, obligation, or liability 
chargeable to the partnership arising from negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct committed 
while the partnership is registered as a limited liability partnership and in the course of the 
partnership business by another partner, or an employee, agent, or representative of the limited 
liability partnership. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), a partner in a limited liability partnership is liable for 
his own negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 15; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 69-1-12; L. 1994, ch. 61, § 3. 
© 2003 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. Ail rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions 
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
Tab 4 
S 26. Nature of partner's liability. (a) Except as provided in 
subdivision (b) of this section, all partners are liable: 
1. Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership 
under sections twenty-four and twenty-five. 
2. Jointly for ail other debts and obligations of the partnership; 
but any partner may enter into a separate obligation to perform a 
partnership contract. 
(b) Except as provided by subdivisions (c) and (d) of this secrion, 
no partner of a partnership which is a registered limited liability 
partnership is liable or accountable, directly or indirectly (including 
by way of indemnification, contribution or otherwise) , for any debts, 
obligations or liabilities of, or chargeable to, the registered limited 
liability partnership or each other, whether arising in tort, contract 
or otherwise, which are incurred, created or assumed by such partnership 
while such partnership is a registered limited liability partnership, 
solely by reason of being such a partner or acting (or omitting to act) 
in such capacity or rendering professional services or otherwise 
participating (as an employee, consultant, contractor or otherwise) in 
the conduct of the other business or • activities of the registered 
limited liability partnership. 
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (b) of this 
section, (i) each partner, employee or agent of a partnership which is a 
registered limited liability partnership shall be personally and fully 
liable and accountable for any negligent or wrongful act or misconduct 
committed by him or her or by any person under his or her direct 
supervision and control while rendering professional services on behalf 
of such registered limited liability partnership and (ii) each 
shareholder, director, officer, member, manager, partner, employee and 
agent of a professional service corporation, foreign professional 
service corporation, professional service limited liability company, 
foreign professional service limited liability company, registered 
limited liability partnership, foreign limited liability partnership or 
professional partnership that is a partner, employee or agent of a 
partnership which is a registered limited liability partnership shall be 
personally and fully liable and accountable for any negligent or 
wrongful act or misconduct committed by him or her or by any person 
under his or her direct supervision and control while rendering 
professional services in his or her capacity as a partner, employee or 
agent of such registered limited liability partnership. The relationship 
of a professional to a registered limited liability partnership with 
which such professional is associated, whether as a partner, employee or 
agent, shall not modify or diminish the jurisdiction over such 
professional of the licensing authority and in the case of an attorney 
and counsellor-at-law or a professional service corporation, 
professional service limited liability company, foreign professional 
service limited liability company, registered limited liability 
partnership, foreign limited liability partnership, foreign professional 
service corporation or professional partnership, engaged in the practice 
of law, the other courts of this state. 
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (b) of this 
section, all or specified partners of a partnership which is a 
registered limited liability partnership may be liable in their capacity 
as partners for all or specified debts, obligations or liabilities of a 
registered limited liability partnership to the extent at least a 
majority of the partners shall have agreed unless otherwise provided in 
any agreement between the partners. Any such agreement may be modified 
or revoked to the extent at least a majority of the partners shall have 
agreed, unless otherwise provided in any agreement between the partners; 
provided, however, that (i) any such modification or revocation shall 
not affect the liability of a partner for any debts, obligations or 
liabilities of a registered limited liability partnership incurred, 
created or assumed by such registered limited liability partnership 
prior to such modification or revocation and (ii) a partner shall be 
liable for debts, obligations and liabilities of the registered limited 
liability partnership incurred, created or assumed after such 
modification or revocation only in accordance with this article and, if 
such agreement is further modified, such agreement as so further 
modified but only to the extent not inconsistent with subdivision (c) of 
this section. Nothing in this section shall in any way affect or impair 
the ability of a partner to act as a guarantor or surety for, provide 
collateral for or otherwise be liable for, the debts, obligations or 
liabilities of a registered limited liability partnership. 
(e) Subdivision (b) of this section shall not affect the liability of 
a registered limited liability partnership out of partnership assets for 
partnership debts, obligations and liabilities. 
(f) Neither the withdrawal or revocation of a registered limited 
liability partnership pursuant to subdivision (f) or (g) , respectively, 
of section 121-1500 of this chapter nor the dissolution, winding up or 
termination of a registered limited liability partnership shall affect 
the applicability of the provisions of subdivision (b) of this section 
for any debt, obligation or liability incurred, created or assumed while 
the partnership was a registered limited liability partnership. 
S 27. Partner by estoppel. 1. When a person, by words spoken or 
written or by conduct, represents himself, or consents to another 
representing him to any one, as a partner in an existing partnership or 
with one or more persons not actual partners, he is liable to any such 
person to whom such representation has been made, who has, on the faith of 
such representation, given credit to the actual or apparent partnership, 
and if he has made such representation or consented to its being made in a 
public manner he is liable to such person, whether the representation has 
or has not been made or communicated to such person so giving credit by or 
with the knowledge of the apparent partner making the representation or 
consenting to its being made. 
(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as though he were 
an actual member of the partnership. 
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly with the 
other persons, if any, so consenting to the contract or representation as 
to incur liability, otherwise separately. 
2. When a person has been thus represented to be a partner in an 
existing partnership, or with one or more persons not actual partners, he 
is an agent of the persons consenting to such representation to bind them 
to the same extent and in the same manner as though he were a partner in 
fact, with respect to persons who rely upon the representation. Where all 
the members of the existing partnership consent to the representation, a 
partnership act or obligation results; but in all other cases it is the 
joint act or obligation of the person acting and the persons consenting to 
the representation. 
S 28. Liability of incoming partner. A person admitted as a partner 
into an existing partnership is liable for all the obligations of the 
partnership arising before his admission as though he had been a partner 
when such obligations were incurred, except that his liability shall be 
satisfied only out of partnership property. 
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